Research: Asset Specificity in Climate Politics: How Polluting Firms Become Climate Policy Supporters
When do polluting firms support ambitious climate policy? Political economy scholarship largely assumes that emissions-intensive incumbents oppose the green transition. I argue that asset specificity, alongside emissions intensity, shapes how firms respond to the threat of asset stranding. Low asset specificity allows firms to repurpose emissions-intensive assets, and the extent of repurposing shapes their politics: divestors, who exit emissions-intensive assets, support carrots and sticks, whereas diversifiers support carrots but oppose sticks. A process-tracing case study of the EU's combustion-engine phaseout supports this argument. High-specificity drivetrain suppliers uniformly opposed the phaseout, while low-specificity car manufacturers split by repurposing strategy rather than adjustment costs. When divesting manufacturers reinvested in combustion engines, their support vanished, paving the way for the proposed repeal. The findings challenge static accounts of firm preferences in climate politics and illuminate how incumbents navigate rapid technological change more broadly.